U.S-Iran ceasefire talks are live, but so is the war. Here's what's really happening right now and what comes next.
Image Credit: Leonardo AI
- Trump claims the US is in active talks with Iran to end the war. Iran publicly denies it and calls the claims psychological warfare.
- The US has struck over 7,800 targets inside Iran since Operation Epic Fury launched on February 28, 2026.
- The Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20 percent of the world's oil, has been effectively closed since early March, sending Brent crude to a peak of 126 dollars per barrel.
- Iran rejected the US 15-point ceasefire plan on March 25 and issued its own five-point counterproposal demanding war reparations and legal sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
- The IEA has described this as the greatest global energy security challenge in recorded history, worse in scale than the 1973 and 1979 oil crises combined.
- Iran's parallel economy, built over seven years to work around US sanctions, has significantly weakened the main incentive in the US ceasefire proposal.
- The IRGC, which controls an estimated 40 percent of Iran's economy, has stronger internal influence today than at any point under the previous supreme leader, making any ceasefire agreement structurally harder to close.
Two world powers. One is talking about peace on television. The other says the conversations never happened. Somewhere in the middle, missiles are still flying, tankers are still anchored outside a closed strait, and the price of filling your car is approaching numbers that would have seemed fictional two months ago.
What follows is a complete accounting of where this war stands, why the ceasefire proposals have failed, and what most coverage is leaving out.
In This Article
- How This War Actually Started
- Operation Epic Fury: What the US Has Done So Far
- Iran Strikes Back Across the Entire Region
- The Diplomacy Contradiction: Talks or No Talks
- Why the Mediators Cannot Close This Deal
- The US 15-Point Plan vs Iran's 5-Point Counter
- The Bargaining Chip That Already Expired
- Why the Proxy Funding Demand Does Not Work in Practice
- The Strait of Hormuz: Why a 21-Mile Waterway Matters This Much
- What This War Is Doing to Your Wallet Right Now
- The Nuclear Question Nobody in This War Can Ignore
- What Airstrikes on Nuclear Facilities Actually Achieve
- Who Is Actually Making Iran's Decisions Right Now
- Three Realistic Scenarios
- DesiDaily Take
How This War Actually Started
This did not come from nowhere. Years of pressure, failed diplomacy, and a nuclear standoff culminated in their collapse all at once.
After the US pulled out of the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran kept enriching uranium. By December 2024, the IAEA reported Iran was enriching uranium to levels approaching weapons-grade. Washington and Tel Aviv treated this as a threshold crossed.
In early 2026, both sides tried to talk. Indirect negotiations began in Muscat, Oman, on February 6, 2026, mediated by Oman's foreign minister, Badr Al-Busaidi. A second round followed in Geneva. On February 25, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called a historic agreement within reach.
Then everything collapsed. On February 27, 2026, Oman's FM announced a breakthrough: Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium and to allow full IAEA verification. Talks were scheduled to resume on March 2. One day later, the US and Israel launched airstrikes anyway. Al-Busaidi said publicly that active and serious negotiations had been deliberately undermined.
It remains one of the most jarring reversals in modern diplomatic history, and it is now central to why Iran refuses to treat any US proposal as credible. The timing of the strike, one day after a confirmed diplomatic breakthrough, created a trust deficit that no subsequent message through Pakistan or Egypt can easily paper over.
Operation Epic Fury: What the US Has Done So Far
On February 28, 2026, President Donald Trump announced the launch of a joint US-Israeli military campaign codenamed Operation Epic Fury. He did it via an eight-minute video on Truth Social at 2:00 AM Eastern Time, not a congressional address, not a press conference, a social media post in the middle of the night.
According to US Naval Institute News, the opening strikes hit over 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours alone, deploying B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, F-35s, F-22 Raptors, THAAD missile defense systems, and HIMARS rocket units. The opening strike targeted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's compound in central Tehran. His death was confirmed within 24 hours. Iran's new supreme leader, his son Mojtaba Khamenei, was elected on March 8, 2026.
The Iranian Red Crescent reported that over 6,668 civilian structures were targeted, including 65 schools and 14 medical centres. The Stimson Center noted that the war was launched without congressional approval and without any public debate, a point legal scholars argue raises serious constitutional questions under Article II of the US Constitution.
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said on March 25 that US forces are very close to meeting the core objectives of the military action and that productive conversations with Iran are ongoing. She also warned that if Iran fails to accept the situation, President Trump will ensure they are hit harder than they have ever been hit before.
Thirteen US service members died in Operation Epic Fury. Six were killed in a single Iranian drone attack at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, on March 1, 2026. According to JINSA's March 16 update, Iran's missile production capacity was driven to zero by mid-March. But Iran adapted quickly, shifting toward drone swarm tactics and explosive-laden maritime vessels that are far cheaper to manufacture.
Iran Strikes Back Across the Entire Region
Iran did not absorb the blows quietly. It punched back across the whole Gulf, not just at Israel.
Iranian missiles and drones hit Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. A Shahed-136 drone struck a radar installation at the US Naval Support Activity in Bahrain. Iranian missiles targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. The IRGC claimed two ballistic missiles were also launched toward Diego Garcia, the US base deep in the Indian Ocean.
Flashpoint's operational intelligence report documented that at least 282 Iranian missiles and 833 drones were intercepted by Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE air defenses in the early phase of the war. The UAE alone intercepted 6 Iranian missiles and 21 drones in a single night.
According to Wikipedia's open-source aggregation of conflict reporting, by March 5, a military source told Fars News Agency that Iran had fired over 500 ballistic and naval missiles and almost 2,000 drones since February 28. The rate of launches declined after March 4, with analysts pointing to both depleted stocks and a deliberate strategy of rationing for a longer conflict.
On March 25, Iran launched a fresh wave of strikes that sparked a massive fire at Kuwait International Airport. The same day, Israel launched multiple waves of airstrikes in Tehran and confirmed targeting an Iranian submarine development centre in Isfahan. Hezbollah has continued firing rockets into northern Israel around the clock since the war began, displacing hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians. Israel's operations in Lebanon have killed over 1,000 people this month alone and displaced more than one million, including nearly 370,000 children, according to UN OCHA.
Iran also deployed what analysts call suicide skiffs: explosive drone boats disguised as fishing vessels, using frequency-hopping encryption that makes them difficult to detect and nearly impossible to stop at scale.
The Diplomacy Contradiction: Talks or No Talks
Here is where the story gets genuinely strange. And, if you step back far enough, a little absurd.
On Tuesday, March 24, Trump told reporters that the US was in negotiations with Iran right now. He named the negotiating team as special envoy Steve Witkoff, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Vice President JD Vance. He said they have agreed they will never have a nuclear weapon. He added that Iran's leaders want to make a deal so badly but are afraid to say it publicly for fear of being killed.
Iran's response was a total rejection. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on state television, " We are not in talks with the US, and we do not plan on any negotiations. Iranian military spokesperson Lt. Col. Ebrahim Zolfaghari asked publicly whether the US administration had reached the stage of negotiating with itself. According to Al Jazeera, Araghchi also said that Trump's shift toward discussing negotiations is itself an acknowledgment of failure; the US had previously demanded unconditional surrender, and the very act of sending a peace plan admits that position has collapsed.
NPR confirmed that backchannel efforts are underway through Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly posted on X that his country stands ready to host direct talks, tagging Trump, Witkoff, and the Iranian foreign minister in the same post. Iran's FM has had calls with officials in all three countries. Mediators are pushing for in-person talks in Islamabad as early as this Friday.
"There is total confusion, total obscurity, and it's really making this situation very interesting and very strange." Al Jazeera's Mohamed Vall, reporting from Tehran, March 25, 2026
CNBC reported that Iran's foreign minister confirmed messages have been exchanged via friendly countries, but stressed those communications do not constitute negotiations. So something is happening. It just is not what Trump describes on television.
Iran also remains deeply suspicious of the US, which has attacked Iran twice during active diplomatic talks under the Trump administration: once in January 2020 with the killing of Qasem Soleimani, and now on February 28, 2026, one day after Oman announced a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations. Trust, at this point, is not just low. It is essentially nonexistent.
Why the Mediators Cannot Close This Deal
Three countries are currently named as backchannel facilitators: Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. None of them has the structural capacity to actually broker a deal of this magnitude. Understanding why matters because it explains why the backchannel has produced messages but no movement.
Oman was the country that made the 2015 JCPOA process possible. It has a rare combination of characteristics: a small, wealthy state with no regional military ambitions, a ruling family that neither Washington nor Tehran views as a political threat, and direct relationships with both governments going back decades. FM Al-Busaidi's public statement after February 28 that active and serious negotiations were deliberately undermined destroyed that neutral standing. Oman cannot mediate because it has now publicly assigned blame to one party.
Pakistan is carrying messages. But Pakistan is structurally conflicted. It shares a border and deep economic ties with Iran, including an active cross-border gas pipeline negotiation valued in the billions. It also depends on approximately $3 billion in US security assistance over the past decade, and its current IMF programme is linked directly to Washington's goodwill. Pakistan can pass notes. It cannot apply meaningful pressure on either side without damaging itself.
Turkey has positioned itself as a major mediator, and Erdogan has offered to host direct talks. But Turkey is a NATO member with ongoing procurement disputes with Washington over F-16 deliveries and Syria policy. Iran does not view Turkey as genuinely neutral; Turkish military interests have historically conflicted with Iranian proxy networks in Syria and Iraq.
Egypt's FM Abdelatty made public statements calling for diplomacy. Egypt receives roughly $1.3 billion annually in US military aid. Cairo is not in a position to pressure Washington.
| Mediator | Leverage on Iran | Leverage on the US | Key constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oman | High historically | Moderate | Publicly blamed the US for undermining the Feb 27 breakthrough. Credibility was damaged with Washington. |
| Pakistan | Moderate (shared border, trade ties) | Low | IMF programme and US security aid dependency. Cannot afford to pressure either side. |
| Turkey | Low to moderate | Low | NATO member. Active disputes with Washington. Iran views Turkey's regional interests as competitive, not neutral. |
| Egypt | Low | Low | $1.3 billion annual US military aid. Cannot challenge Washington's position at the table. |
| China | Very high (buys 90% of Iran's oil) | Indirect but significant | Has said almost nothing publicly. Has not decided whether a settlement serves its interests. |
What effective mediation actually requires in this context is a country with no security dependence on the US, direct access to IRGC decision-makers rather than just the foreign ministry, and the ability to offer Iran something the deal itself does not. China meets all three criteria and has remained almost entirely silent. Whether Beijing decides it is in its interest to push Iran toward a settlement is the single variable most analysts are watching, but few publications are reporting on it directly. For more on China's silence throughout this conflict, read our coverage of why China has said almost nothing about this war.
The US 15-Point Plan vs Iran's 5-Point Counter: What Both Sides Actually Want
The Wall Street Journal first reported the existence of the US ceasefire proposal. Pakistan delivered it to Tehran. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed there are elements of truth to it but declined to confirm the full text, saying some published versions were not entirely factual.
Based on reporting from Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy, and PBS NewsHour, here is what the US plan demands from Iran:
- A 30-day ceasefire
- Full dismantlement of nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow
- A permanent commitment to never develop nuclear weapons
- Handover of all enriched uranium to the IAEA
- A complete halt to uranium enrichment inside Iran
- Limits on the range and total number of Iran's ballistic missiles
- End Iranian funding for regional proxy groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis
- Full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz
In return, the US offered to lift all nuclear-related sanctions and provide support for Iran's civilian nuclear programme at Bushehr.
Iran called the plan maximalist and unreasonable. On March 25, 2026, Iran formally rejected the proposal and issued a five-point counterproposal of its own, which The Hill reported in full. Iran's conditions are:
- A complete end to all acts of aggression and assassinations by the US and Israel
- Concrete and legally guaranteed mechanisms ensuring the war cannot be reimposed on Iran
- Payment of war reparations and compensation for all damages
- A comprehensive end to hostilities across all fronts, including for all regional resistance groups
- Full recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz as Iran's natural and legal right
Iran also signalled it would charge tolls on ships passing through the strait once it regains full control, according to CNBC. Iranian military spokesperson Zolfaghari confirmed that the authority to issue passage permits belongs to Iran.
The gap between these two positions is enormous. The US wants zero enrichment. Iran calls that a violation of its sovereign rights. The US wants Hormuz open with no conditions. Iran calls it its most consequential strategic asset. Until one side moves on at least one of those two points, there is no deal, regardless of what anyone says at a podium.
Iran's demand for sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz is not just a legal or political question. It means Tehran would have the power to decide which countries' ships pass, at what price, and under what conditions, permanently. That would fundamentally change how global energy markets function, who pays more for oil, and what groceries cost in Chicago, London, and Delhi.
The Bargaining Chip That Already Expired
The US's central offer in the 15-point plan is to lift nuclear-related sanctions. In 2015, that offer was decisive. Iran's economy was under severe stress, with roughly $150 billion in frozen assets and oil revenues that had dropped sharply under coordinated US and EU pressure. The JCPOA deal closed because the economic pain was acute enough to force movement.
The situation in 2026 is structurally different, and this is the part that most ceasefire analysis is skipping entirely.
After the US exited the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran spent the next seven years building around them. The result is a parallel economic infrastructure that sanctions relief does not automatically dismantle.
Iran developed what is now referred to as a ghost tanker fleet: an estimated 140 to 200 oil tankers operating without AIS transponder signals, carrying Iranian crude to buyers in Asia while remaining invisible to Western tracking systems. China absorbs most of this oil at discounts of roughly 20 to 25 dollars per barrel below Brent benchmark prices. That arrangement continues regardless of what any ceasefire agreement says about sanctions.
Iran's non-oil exports reached approximately $53 billion in 2024, according to Iranian customs data, compared to under $30 billion a decade earlier. Petrochemicals, construction materials, food products, and manufactured goods now account for a larger share of export revenue than at any previous point.
The IRGC, which controls an estimated 40 percent of Iran's economy through its engineering and construction conglomerate Khatam al-Anbiya (which holds contracts valued in the tens of billions), along with telecoms and logistics operations, functions largely outside the formal banking system that US sanctions target most directly. Iran also developed barter and gold-based payment systems with Turkey and several Central Asian states specifically to conduct commerce without USD-denominated banking.
| Factor | Iran in 2015 (JCPOA era) | Iran in 2026 (post-adaptation) |
|---|---|---|
| Frozen assets | Estimated $150 billion locked in foreign accounts | Assets long repositioned; China-held reserves less accessible to Western pressure. |
| Oil export revenue | Heavily dependent on formal oil sales; severely squeezed by sanctions | Ghost tanker fleet of 140-200 vessels; China buys at a $20-25 discount below Brent |
| Non-oil exports | Approx. $25-30 billion annually | Approx. $53 billion (2024 Iranian customs data) |
| Alternative payment systems | Minimal; heavily dependent on SWIFT and dollar transactions | Active barter and gold-based systems with Turkey and Central Asia |
| IRGC economic footprint | Significant but less dominant | Est. 40% of the domestic economy via Khatam al-Anbiya and affiliated conglomerates |
| Sanctions leverage on regime decision-making | High economic pain was acute and politically visible | Moderate; adapted infrastructure absorbs pressure that would have been fatal in 2015 |
The practical result is that lifting nuclear-related sanctions removes pressure on the most formalized parts of the Iranian economy. The IRGC conglomerates, the ghost tanker fleet, and the barter trade remain largely intact. Iran's negotiating team knows this. It is one structural reason the counterproposal focused on reparations and sovereignty guarantees rather than economic relief.
This does not mean sanctions are irrelevant. It means that the 2015 formula, which worked because the economic pressure was existential at that moment, has a weaker equivalent in 2026. The US is offering something that Iran has spent seven years learning to live without.
Why the Proxy Funding Demand Does Not Work in Practice
The US 15-point plan demands that Iran end funding for Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Iran's annual transfers to Hezbollah were estimated at roughly $700 million per year before the war began, according to US Treasury Department assessments. That transfer has been disrupted by the conflict. But the demand assumes the groups are financially dependent on that transfer in a way that makes them controllable through it. That assumption is partially outdated, and it is worth examining why.
Hezbollah's financing has at least three distinct layers. The first is Iranian state transfers. The second is Hezbollah's own commercial operations, particularly across West Africa, where Hezbollah-linked business networks operate in construction, trade, and telecommunications in countries including Ivory Coast, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The US Treasury has sanctioned multiple Hezbollah-linked West African businesses over the past decade, but the networks have consistently reconstituted. The third layer is diaspora donations from the Lebanese Shia community globally, which function outside any channel that a ceasefire clause can legally reach.
The Houthis have controlled Yemen's northern customs infrastructure since 2014, including the port of Hodeidah, one of Yemen's main entry points for commercial goods. They tax imports and generate an estimated $1.5 to $2 billion annually in customs revenue from the territories they govern, according to UN Panel of Experts reports on Yemen. Iranian funding is significant to the Houthis, but it is not the only income source, and the customs revenue line persists regardless of what Iran agrees to in any ceasefire.
Hamas held cryptocurrency wallets estimated at $41 million before October 2023, according to the Israeli National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing. After Israeli and US action froze those wallets, new wallets appeared quickly. Hamas has shifted toward increasingly fragmented financial structures specifically to survive targeted enforcement.
| Group | Iranian funding (estimated annual) | Parallel revenue sources | Realistic impact of Iran cutting transfers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hezbollah | Approx. $700 million pre-war | West African business networks (construction, telecoms, trade); Lebanese diaspora donations | Significant short-term pressure; operational capacity reduced but not eliminated. Networks would partially compensate within 12-18 months. |
| Houthis | Estimated $100-200 million annually | Hodeidah port customs revenue ($1.5-2B annually per UN Panel of Experts); domestic taxation | Limited. Customs revenue exceeds Iranian transfers. The group is economically semi-autonomous. |
| Hamas | Estimated $100 million annually | Cryptocurrency (fragmented post-enforcement); diaspora donations; Qatar-mediated transfers | Moderate. Financial structure already rebuilt post-2023 enforcement. New channels operational. |
Practically, even if Iran agrees in writing to stop transfers and the agreement includes verification mechanisms, the groups' parallel revenue streams mean that financial capacity would not collapse within any reasonable diplomatic timeframe. The demand is verifiable only at the level of direct Iranian bank transfers, which already flow through informal channels. It is not verifiable at the level of West African business networks or Houthi customs revenue in Hodeidah.
This is not an argument that the demand is strategically wrong. It is an observation that signing it into a ceasefire agreement does not produce the outcome the US is seeking. A ceasefire with this clause intact could be declared a success in Washington while changing very little on the ground in Lebanon, Yemen, or Gaza.
The Strait of Hormuz: Why a 21-Mile Waterway Matters This Much
The Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, surrounded on three sides by Iranian territory. Every day in peacetime, around 20 million barrels of oil move through that channel. That is roughly 20 percent of the world's entire oil supply, along with approximately a fifth of the world's liquefied natural gas.
Iran closed it. The UN's trade body, UNCTAD, has confirmed in published research that disruptions to the strait carry catastrophic consequences for global trade and the world's most vulnerable economies.
On March 2, 2026, an IRGC commander confirmed the strait was closed. No tanker broadcasting an AIS signal moved through it that night. Insurance war-risk clauses kicked in immediately, making it financially unviable for most ship owners to attempt transit. Over 1,000 ships, most of them oil tankers, anchored outside the strait and waited, according to NPR. About 20,000 seafarers are stranded in the area, drawing condemnation from UN agencies and human rights organisations.
Since then, Iran has allowed selective passage. Ships from countries it considers neutral, Pakistan and India among them, have been waved through. China and Iraq were reported to be in active negotiations with Iranian authorities for safe passage. But the core blockade remains in effect for any vessel linked to the US, Israel, or their allies.
The International Energy Agency's March 2026 Oil Market Report stated that Gulf countries cut total oil production by at least 10 million barrels per day, the largest single supply disruption in the recorded history of global oil markets. Brent crude surged past 120 dollars a barrel and hit a peak of 126 dollars. In response, the IEA took the unprecedented step of releasing 400 million barrels from global emergency reserves.
It helped briefly. Then oil climbed again. The IEA described the situation as worse than the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 combined. Trump initially asked NATO countries to help forcibly reopen the waterway. NATO declined. He then issued an ultimatum to Iran to reopen by March 23. When that deadline came, he backed off and extended it by five days, citing diplomatic progress. Iran called the extension a tactic.
What This War Is Doing to Your Wallet Right Now
This conflict stopped being a Middle East problem about five minutes after the first missile landed.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas modelled the economic impact directly: a one-quarter closure of the Strait of Hormuz is expected to push average WTI oil prices to 98 dollars a barrel and cut global real GDP growth by an annualised 2.9 percentage points.
Axios reported that Goldman Sachs analysts raised US recession odds by 5 percentage points to 25 percent. If oil averages 110 dollars through March and April, Goldman sees US inflation hitting 3.3 percent and GDP dropping to 2.1 percent. Oxford Economics modelled a scenario where oil averages 140 dollars per barrel and found it would push the Eurozone, the UK, and Japan into outright recession.
California gasoline surged above 5 dollars per gallon in the second week of March 2026. Nationally, average pump prices crossed 4 dollars per gallon. The US Postal Service announced a first-ever 8 percent fuel surcharge on packages, adding costs for American consumers and businesses nationwide, CNN confirmed.
It does not stop at fuel. CNBC's supply chain reporting highlighted that urea fertiliser prices jumped from 475 to 680 dollars per metric ton. That hits food prices directly, and it is hitting at the spring planting season for corn and soy in the American Midwest. Natural gas supplies through the strait have also been disrupted, with the IEA noting that 90 percent of crude oil destined for Asia passes through Hormuz, making this as much an Asian economic crisis as an American one.
The Nuclear Question Nobody in This War Can Ignore
At the centre of everything is uranium. It always was.
Iran's formal nuclear weapons programme was suspended in 2003, following a fatwa by Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran maintained that its enrichment was entirely for civilian power generation. But by late 2024, the IAEA reported enrichment approaching weapons-grade levels, with Iran refusing to answer inspectors' questions about undisclosed sites. Washington and Tel Aviv found the civilian explanation unconvincing.
The US and Israel destroyed Iran's key nuclear facilities, Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, setting the programme back by an estimated two years, according to the US Department of Defense. But the ambition survived.
During pre-war negotiations, US envoy Steve Witkoff noted that Iran's team had confirmed possession of 460 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, enough material, if further enriched to weapons-grade, for approximately 11 nuclear bombs. Iran says it has no weapons ambitions and maintains the material is for civilian use. The gap between those two claims is precisely where trust breaks down.
Israel struck a submarine development centre in Isfahan on March 24. When an Iranian missile came close to Israel's Dimona nuclear research facility the same week, it reminded every government watching that this conflict has the potential to escalate into territory that no diplomatic playbook currently covers. For more on what that escalation risk looks like in the current threat environment, read our coverage of nuclear deterrence in 2026 and why no treaty currently constrains the key players.
Iran's new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is younger and less predictable than his father. Israeli PM Netanyahu's foreign policy adviser, Ophir Falk, told CNN directly: Iran always lies, and we have learned they always lie. He outlined three paths to Israel's goal: removing the regime, degrading military capability, or diplomacy. Israel has made clear it prefers the first two. That makes any US ceasefire deal significantly harder to close, since Israel would need to agree to stop targeting Iranian leadership figures, which is explicitly one of Iran's five conditions.
What Airstrikes on Nuclear Facilities Actually Achieve
The US Department of Defense stated that Iran's nuclear programme was set back by approximately two years as a result of strikes on Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. The two-year figure refers specifically to destroyed centrifuge halls, uranium hexafluoride processing equipment, and enrichment infrastructure. It does not address what was not destroyed.
Iran has approximately 4,000 nuclear scientists and engineers. That knowledge base is intact. Iran has domestic uranium ore deposits in Yazd and other provinces. Those are intact. Iran has the industrial capacity to manufacture centrifuge components domestically. That capacity is damaged but not eliminated.
The historical record on what airstrikes against nuclear facilities actually produce is worth reading directly, because it does not align with the two-year-setback framing.
| Facility | Year struck | What was destroyed | What actually happened to the programme afterward | Transferable to Iran? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Osirak reactor, Iraq | 1981 (Israel) | Reactor building, core infrastructure | Saddam Hussein accelerated the programme. By 1991, it was more advanced than at the time of the strike. Airstrike changed the programme's structure, not its ambition. | Partially. Iraq lacked domestic uranium but had a similar political motivation to reconstitute. |
| Al-Kibar facility, Syria | 2007 (Israel) | Suspected nuclear reactor under construction | Syria did not reconstitute it. The programme effectively ended. | No. Syria lacked the scientific base, industrial capacity, and domestic uranium Iran possesses. This case does not transfer. |
| Libya's nuclear programme | Voluntary dismantlement, 2003 | All enrichment equipment (voluntary handover) | Programme ended. Gaddafi was removed in a NATO-supported operation in 2011. Iranian officials cite Libya repeatedly as proof that surrendering nuclear capability removes deterrence without guaranteeing safety. | No. Voluntary, not military. And the outcome for Gaddafi is now part of Iran's stated rationale for resisting disarmament. |
| Natanz, Isfahan, Fordow, Iran | 2025-2026 (US-Israel) | Centrifuge halls, enrichment infrastructure | Two-year setback per US DoD estimate. 4,000 nuclear scientists intact. Domestic uranium deposits intact. Reconstitution technically possible. | N/A. This is the current case under analysis. |
The underlying point is consistent across these cases. Airstrikes can destroy centrifuge halls. They cannot destroy the knowledge of how to build them, the engineers who operate them, or the domestic uranium that feeds them. A two-year physical infrastructure setback is real and meaningful in the short term. It is not equivalent to a two-year setback in nuclear ambition.
Iran's new leadership has every political incentive to reconstitute faster than the previous timeline. Mojtaba Khamenei needs to establish authority inside Iran's domestic power structure. Announcing that Iran will rebuild its nuclear programme faster than it was destroyed is precisely the kind of assertion that consolidates domestic political credibility in Tehran's current environment.
The Libya case deserves particular attention because it is the one historical precedent that proves voluntary denuclearisation is possible. Gaddafi was dismantled in 2003. He was removed in 2011. Every Iranian official who has spoken publicly about nuclear negotiations has cited that outcome. It is not rhetoric. It shapes the actual risk calculation Iran's leadership is running.
Who Is Actually Making Iran's Decisions Right Now
Advanced AnalysisMost ceasefire analysis focuses on what Iran's foreign minister says in press conferences. That is the wrong place to look for a reliable signal. The foreign ministry reflects one of four distinct power centres inside Iran's decision-making structure. The others are the Supreme Leader's office, the IRGC, and the elected presidency. These power centres do not always operate from the same position, and they frequently communicate different signals to different audiences at the same time.
FM Araghchi saying publicly that Iran is not in talks while simultaneously confirming that messages are being exchanged via Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt is not an inconsistency. It reflects two different institutional voices communicating to two different audiences simultaneously. The foreign ministry manages Iran's public diplomatic posture. The IRGC manages Iran's operational position. They are not required to match, and historically they often do not.
Mojtaba Khamenei's elevation as Supreme Leader on March 8, 2026, is structurally significant for one specific reason: he has no independent power base. His father built authority over 34 years by carefully balancing the IRGC, the clerical establishment in Qom, and civilian government factions. Mojtaba begins with inherited legitimacy and no established factional alliances of his own. That structural vacuum increases the IRGC's relative influence inside Iran's internal decision-making at exactly the moment when ceasefire decisions must be made.
| Power centre | What it controls | Current position on ceasefire | Veto capacity over any deal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supreme Leader's office (Mojtaba Khamenei) | Final religious authority; armed forces command; judiciary; media | Unclear. New leader. Establishing domestic authority. Needs IRGC cooperation to govern. | Formal yes. Practical capacity is constrained by a lack of an independent factional base. |
| IRGC (Commander: Hossein Salami) | Ground, air, and naval forces; ballistic missile programme; Quds Force proxies; est. 40% of the domestic economy via Khatam al-Anbiya | Explicitly maximalist. Salami stated in mid-March that the war creates conditions for Iran's greatest victory. | Effective yes. Controls forces that any ceasefire requires to stop firing. Economic interests diverge from the specific deal on offer. |
| Foreign Ministry (FM Araghchi) | Diplomatic communications; international negotiations; public posture | Publicly: no negotiations. Privately: exchanging messages. Managing the gap between the two. | No direct veto. Dependent on IRGC sign-off for any commitment to hold. |
| Elected presidency | Budget; domestic economic policy; some diplomatic appointments | Limited public statements. Focused on domestic economic management under wartime conditions. | No. Weakest veto capacity in wartime. |
The IRGC has two structural reasons to resist a ceasefire as currently constructed. The first is political. Accepting terms based on the US 15-point plan would require the IRGC to publicly accept an outcome that its own public statements have framed as defeat. An institution whose commander has described the war as creating conditions for Iran's greatest victory does not easily pivot to signing a ceasefire that involves dismantling nuclear sites and acknowledging Hormuz as an international waterway.
The second reason is economic. Any ceasefire that includes broad sanctions relief on civilian oil exports and banking reintegration benefits the National Iranian Oil Company and Iran's formal banking sector. Those entities compete with IRGC-linked oil trading operations, which currently profit from discounted informal sales to China. A deal structured around lifting formal sanctions does not necessarily serve IRGC institutional interests. In some sectors, it directly works against them.
Any ceasefire negotiated between the US and Iran's foreign ministry requires IRGC sign-off to hold operationally. The foreign ministry does not command Iranian forces. The IRGC does. A diplomatic agreement that does not have IRGC buy-in is an agreement that lasts until the IRGC decides it does not.
This is the structural reality that makes the current backchannel approach insufficient on its own. Witkoff, talking to Araghchi, even indirectly through Pakistan, is talking to the wrong institution. The relevant conversation has to reach Salami's office, and nothing in the current reported diplomatic contact suggests it has.
Three Realistic Scenarios
Backchannel diplomacy via Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey produces a face-saving framework. Iran agrees to halt enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief and a credible non-aggression commitment. The IRGC calculates that the deal preserves enough of its economic position. Trump claims a historic victory. Iran says it was never militarily defeated. Bombers fly home. Oil drops. This is the best case, and it requires movement from both sides on points each has currently described as non-negotiable.
Talks drag on at low intensity for weeks or months. Strikes slow but continue. The Strait of Hormuz partially reopens under sustained international pressure, particularly from China, which cannot absorb indefinite disruption to its oil supply. Oil stabilises around 90 to 100 dollars a barrel. A formal ceasefire remains elusive. The nuclear question gets deferred, not resolved. This is the most likely case based on current stated positions, and it leaves the world in a prolonged state of managed instability.
No deal. No ceasefire. Oil crosses 140 dollars. The Eurozone enters recession. Iran escalates further across the Gulf. The US deploys the additional 82nd Airborne paratroopers already in movement, on top of the roughly 50,000 troops already in the region. The Pentagon is also deploying two Marine Expeditionary Units, adding approximately 5,000 Marines and thousands of sailors, according to The Irish Times. Iran's newer, younger leadership makes every subsequent decision harder to predict. This is the outcome that neither side publicly wants and that current structural dynamics make more probable than either government's public statements acknowledge.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on March 25 that the situation in the Middle East is out of control and the world is now staring down the barrel of a wider war, according to The Irish Times. Egypt's Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, speaking at a Cairo briefing, said history has taught us that military solutions are not the answer and that there is no winning party in this dangerous escalation.
As of this writing, Trump's self-imposed deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz runs out at the end of this week. Iran says it will reopen the waterway only when its own conditions are met. Those conditions include recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the strait itself, something the US considers a non-starter. That is the circle that nobody has yet found a way to square.
The US-Iran war is being reported, in most outlets, through the lens of one side's framing or the other. The documented record contains things that complicate both narratives.
The US launched Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, one day after Oman's foreign minister announced that Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium and allow full IAEA verification. That timeline is not disputed by any party to the conflict. Al-Busaidi's public statement said active and serious negotiations were deliberately undermined. Whether or not that assessment is accurate, the consequence is documented: Iran's willingness to treat any subsequent US commitment as credible has been structurally damaged. That is not editorial commentary. It is a documented cause-and-effect relationship.
Iran's nuclear programme was, by independent IAEA assessment as of late 2024, approaching weapons-grade enrichment levels, with inspectors denied access to undisclosed sites. The civilian justification became harder to sustain as those access restrictions increased. The security concern that drove Washington's decision had a legitimate factual basis. Both of these things are true simultaneously.
The war's human cost falls most heavily on people who had no decision-making role in starting it. Iranian civilian deaths are confirmed at 742 or more, with over 6,668 civilian structures struck. The Hormuz closure has pushed energy costs onto South and Southeast Asian economies, which import 90 percent of their crude oil through that waterway, according to IEA data. India, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are absorbing an energy shock that decisions made in Washington and Tehran created. No party in this conflict has publicly addressed the distribution of harm.
Neither side currently has a path to the outcome they have publicly defined as victory. The US cannot achieve permanent nuclear dismantlement through airstrikes alone; the history on this point is clear. Iran cannot sustain an economic and military confrontation with the world's largest military power indefinitely. The stated positions of both governments are structurally incompatible. Until at least one of them changes, the Hormuz closure and the conflict costs it generates continue.
The clearest evidence that a deal remains possible: both sides are exchanging messages through intermediaries while publicly denying it. That pattern matches exactly what the pre-JCPOA backchannel looked like between 2011 and 2013. It also matches what the pre-Soleimani strike period looked like in January 2020, right before the US ended those talks with a missile. The pattern is familiar. What it produces next is not.
One question sits at the centre of everything right now: is this a war that can end at a negotiating table, or has the sequence of events since February 28 already made that too difficult?
The answer may come before this weekend is over. Based on everything both sides have said publicly in the last 72 hours, neither one is blinking yet.
What do you think: is a deal still structurally possible, or has the window already closed? Drop your view in the comments below.
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